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Abstract
Several previous papers have marked the United States as an outlier: high poverty rates, low
public social spending but high private social expenditures; a rather strong belief that people are
poor because of laziness or lack of will; and remarkable differences across the States due to state
discretion. With that established context in mind, this paper analyzes U.S. welfare in more detail,
focusing on the impact of TANF—part of the major welfare reform that took place in the United
States in 1996. U.S. welfare reform emphasized an American preference for work, and it was a
move further away from the strategies other “wealthy” nations use to address poverty. Initially
U.S. welfare reform did serve to increase work participation rates, although the earnings of most
individuals who left welfare were still below the poverty line, even many years after their exit. We
found huge variation of welfare eligibility rights across states, depending on the state’s ability to
pay and preferences to meet a certain level of social standard or other (social) objectives such as
child care, work support and employment programs.
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“No one who works full-time and has children at home should be poor anymore. 
No one who can work should be able to stay on welfare forever.” 
(Presidential candidate Clinton, 1992 campaign speech) 
 
“In the absences of a renewed antipoverty effort, many households will continue 
to be unable to afford adequate food, housing, and shelter. Our high poverty rate 
contributes to an erosion of social cohesion, a waste of the human capital of a 
portion of our citizenry, and the moral discomfort of condoning poverty amidst 
affluence.” 
(Scholz, Moffit, and Cowan, 2008, 31) 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1996 the United States passed large-scale welfare reform through the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 
significantly changing the way the nation supports its neediest residents. Welfare 
reform impacted Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and most notably it 
ended the U.S.’s largest cash-based assistance program, Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), replacing it with a new program focused on work 
participation, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). To appreciate 
the successes and failures of TANF, it is first important to understand the intended 
outcomes of the program, the tenants of the program’s rules and how they differ 
from AFDC, and TANF’s place within the context of poverty reduction strategies 
in the United States.  
This paper, part of a series of research papers exploring cross-country 
poverty reduction strategies, follows work that established the United States as an 
outlier in comparison with other “wealthy” nations, with relatively high poverty 
and relatively low rates of social spending. This article takes a detailed look at 
TANF, in part because of the prominence of its role in the U.S. safety net, and in 
part because the passage of PRWORA represents a shift in U.S. policy that moves 
the nation further away from the poverty reduction strategies being implemented 
in other wealthy, developed nations. 
 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, while not the largest cash 
transfer program in the United States,1 is the only direct cash assistance program 
that serves the nonelderly and those who are not disabled. While there are several 
                                            
1  The Earned Income Tax Credit is the largest cash-transfer program serving low-income 
working families at the federal level. In 2008, EITC served 22 million  families, amounting to 
a total of $34 billion dollars in benefits. See, for details, H. Hoynes, “The Earned Income Tax 
Credit, Welfare Reform, and the Employment of Low-Skilled Single Mothers,” University of 
California Davis, 2008. 
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in-kind monthly supports to families, TANF is the only mechanism for providing 
cash directly to poor families in order to supplement their income on a monthly 
basis.2  
This paper begins with a brief primer on U.S. means-tested safety net 
programs for the nonelderly and trends in U.S. safety net spending (Section 2) as 
a way to provide context around U.S. safety net programs including both cash 
transfers and in-kind benefits. It then provides an overview of TANF (Section 3) 
that includes the policy’s objectives and a detailed account of the policy’s 
components. Section 4 moves to an evaluation of TANF through a literature 
review providing insight on some of the major successes and failures of TANF, 
organized by theme, followed by (Section 5) the conclusion.   
 
 
2 U.S. SAFETY NET  
 
2.1 Means-Tested Benefits3 
 
This section serves as a primer on U.S. means-tested, safety net programs. We 
focus solely on the primary means-tested benefits, because these programs have 
explicit antipoverty goals. Means-tested programs are financed by general tax 
revenues, and all restrict benefits to those whose incomes and/or assets fall below 
an established threshold. Some are entitlements—all who satisfy the stipulated 
eligibility requirements get benefits, regardless of the total budgetary cost (e.g., 
Food Stamps). Other means-tested programs, nonentitlements, provide benefits 
only until the funds allocated by Congress or a state are spent even if some 
eligible participants are not served (e.g., TANF).  
Table 1 summarizes the evolution of means-tested (antipoverty) 
spending.4 Note that there has been a sharp reduction in cash entitlements for poor 
families in past decades in the United States. The nature of programs has changed 
as well: cash welfare benefits, for example, have been tied to work requirements; 
partly in response to evolving views about the nature of the poverty problem, 
responsibility for antipoverty policy has also broadened from the antipoverty 
                                            
2  Supplemental Security Income (SSI) provides support to elderly and disabled individuals 
through supplemental monthly income; however, because this program’s eligibility does not 
include all families below an established income threshold, we do not address it directly in 
this paper. 
3  This section summarizes a comprehensive study of Scholz et al. (2008) on trends in income 
support in the United States. See J.K. Scholz, R. Moffitt, and B. Cowan, “Trends in Income 
Support,” Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper 1350-08 (2008), Madison. 
4  Annex A presents figures for Supplemental Security Income as well. 
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agencies of the federal government to those in the U.S. States and to the tax code, 
as evidenced by the move to TANF and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
 
Table 1. Total Means-tested Benefits by Program, 1970-2007 
 
 AFDC/T
ANF 
EITC Medicaid Food 
Stamps 
Housing 
Aid 
School Food 
Programs 
WIC Head 
Start 
 Constant 2007 dollars, billions 
1970 26.5  28.3 3.0 2.7 3.6  1.7 
1975 36.6 4.8 51.8 16.9 8.2 7.4 0.3 1.6 
1980 33.8 5.0 65.5 21.9 13.8 9.1 1.8 1.8 
1985 31.5 4.0 78.9 20.7 22.0 7.3 2.9 2.1 
1990 34.9 12.0 116.9 22.4 24.6 7.1 3.4 2.5 
1995 40.9 35.3 197.1 31.0 37.3 8.5 4.7 4.8 
2000 27.2 38.9 242.7 18.0 34.7 9.1 4.8 6.3 
2005 22.0 45.0 332.8 30.3 40.0 10.6 5.3 7.3 
2006 21.1  319.5 31.0 39.1 10.5 5.2 7.0 
2007      30.3 39.4 10.9 5.5   
 Index: 1980 = 100 
1970 78  43 14 20 40  94 
1975 108 96 79 77 59 81 17 89 
1980 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1985 93 80 120 95 159 80 161 117 
1990 103 240 178 102 178 78 189 139 
1995 121 706 301 142 270 93 261 267 
2000 80 778 371 82 251 100 267 350 
2005 65 900 508 138 290 116 294 406 
2006 62  488 142 283 115 289 389 
2007      138 286 120 306   
 
Abbreviations: AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families; EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit; WIC = Supplemental 
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children. 
 
Source: Scholz et al. (2008, 48-49). 
 
 
Cash-Based Benefits. In the United States there are two major means-tested cash-
based antipoverty programs: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). It is important to note that when 
AFDC was replaced with TANF, several other support mechanisms were added; 
TANF does not exclusively provide cash transfers to families. 
 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was the central safety 
net program for poor families with children from 1936 to 1996. This program was 
directed primarily at single-parent families, although some two-parent families 
with an unemployed parent received benefits. In 1996 the Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families Block Grant (TANF) was created. A five-year lifetime limit 
3
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was imposed on receipt cash assistance (some hardship exemptions were 
allowed), and States had to meet targets for moving recipients into work activities. 
Note—for now—that benefits for ADFC/TANF declined from a peak of about 
$40 billion in 1995 to about $21 billion in 2006. 
In contrast, expenditures on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) have 
grown sharply from $5 billion in 1975 to $45 billion in 2005. No other federal 
antipoverty program has grown so rapidly. The EITC is now U.S.’s largest cash 
antipoverty program. The incentives embedded in the EITC differ from those in 
AFDC/TANF. AFDC recipients with no earnings received the largest welfare 
payments. In contrast, the EITC encourages less-skilled workers to enter the labor 
market, since nonearners do not receive the credit and the EITC amount rises with 
earnings up to about the poverty line. 
 
In-Kind Benefits. The safety net for low-income families in the United States also 
includes in-kind benefit programs, the primary of which are Medicaid, the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)—frequently referred to as 
food stamps, housing assistance, Head Start, school nutrition programs, and the 
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC).  
 With joint funding from the federal government and the states, Medicaid is 
a public health insurance program that provides health coverage for low-income 
individuals and families. Medicaid is an entitlement program; however, income is 
not the only measure for eligibility. States administer their own Medicaid 
programs within the broad guidance provided by the federal government; 
therefore, across the States there are varying eligibility requirements and benefit 
levels.   
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is designed to 
enable low-income households to purchase a nutritionally adequate low-cost diet. 
Between 1994 and 2000, real food stamp expenditures fell to $18 billion from $32 
billion, even though only modest changes to food stamp program rules were made 
through welfare reform. Food stamp participation and spending increased sharply 
between 2000 and 2005. Two factors that contributed to the increase were a 
growing number of people living in poverty over this period, and the use of food 
stamps as federal disaster aid for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma as well as 
other natural disasters. 
The safety net housing assistance programs in the United States provide 
aid in two principal forms: project-based aid (or public housing), where subsidies 
are tied to units constructed for low-income households, and household-based 
subsidies, where renters choose housing units in the existing private housing stock 
and are provided rental assistance vouchers. Public housing is funded in large part 
at the federal level but is operated by independent public housing authorities that 
make decisions about eligibility in adherence with federal rules and regulations. 
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The school lunch and breakfast programs provide federal support for 
meals served by public and private nonprofit elementary and secondary schools, 
and residential child care institutions, that enroll and offer free or reduced-price 
meals to low-income children.  
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC) provides vouchers for food purchase, supplemental food, and 
nutrition risk screening and related nutrition-oriented services to low-income 
pregnant women and low-income women and their children (up to age 5).  
Head Start is an early childhood education program to improve social 
competence, learning skills, health, and the nutrition status of low-income 
children so that they can begin school on an equal basis with their peers from 
more economically successful families. 
 
2.2. EITC and TANF: Caseloads and Poverty 
 
The U.S. safety net has changed in striking ways for the nonelderly; Table 1 
shows the reduction in AFDC/TANF expenditures, which historically went to 
nonworkers, and the increase in EITC benefits, which go overwhelmingly to low-
income workers with children. The Welfare Reform Act of 1996 encouraged 
former AFDC welfare recipients to enter the labor market. The tighter eligibility 
rules of TANF and policy-orientated increases of the EITC—in combination with 
rapid economic growth—“caused” a sharp decrease in the number of welfare 
recipients since 1996. However, the decline in the number of welfare recipients 
(AFDC/TANF) from 12.3 million to 4.5 million from 1996 to 2005 (63 percent) 
did not have a significant impact on unemployment during the same period; see 
Figure 1.  
Studies have shown that the EITC has encouraged large numbers of single 
parents to leave welfare and enter into work. The Committee for Economic 
Development, an organization of 250 corporate executives and university 
presidents, concluded in 2000 that “[t]he EITC has become a powerful force in 
dramatically raising the employment of low-income women in recent years.” In 
2005, the EITC lifted 5.0 million people out of poverty in the United States, 
including 2.6 million children. Without the EITC, the poverty rate among children 
would have been nearly one-fourth higher. The EITC lifts more children out of 
poverty than any other single program or category of programs.5 
 
                                            
5  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 2008. 
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Figure 1.  Number of Recipients of AFDC/TANF and EITC, and 
Unemployment, 1970-2007 (millions) 
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Source: Scholz et al. (2008, 50-51); see Annex B for details. 
 
 
A recent evaluation by Danziger suggests that, in its first few years, the 
1996 welfare reform was more successful in some dimensions (notably, reducing 
caseloads) than in others (raising disposable income).6 The dramatic caseload 
decline has not caused the surge in poverty or homelessness that many critics of 
the 1996 Act predicted, because most former recipients did find jobs. Even though 
many welfare leavers are not working full-time, full-year, and many are working 
at low-wage jobs, a significant number are earning at least as much as they had 
received in cash welfare benefits and some now have higher net income. 
However, despite the large caseload reduction, the U.S. poverty rate fell rather 
little following welfare reform and has risen for the last three consecutive years 
(2006–2009) reaching a 15-year-high (14.3 percent in 2009). Many who have left 
welfare for work remain poor and continue to depend on Food Stamps, Medicaid, 
and other government assistance; others have left welfare and remain poor but do 
not receive the Food Stamp or Medicaid benefits to which they remain entitled. 
The extent of economic hardship remains high because many former and current 
welfare recipients have limited earnings prospects in a labor market that 
increasingly demands higher skills. For example, the end of welfare entitlements 
has meant that some single mothers, with poor labor market prospects and no 
                                            
6  S.H. Danziger, “Chapter 1 – Introduction. What Are the Early Lessons?” in Economic 
Conditions and Welfare Reform, ed. S.H. Danziger (Michigan: Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, 2009). 
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other means of support, have not received the benefits that they would have under 
the pre-1996 welfare system. For single mothers with a high school degree or less, 
despite their increased work hours and earnings over the last decade, about 43 
percent remain poor by the official definition.7 
 
2.3. Social Spending in the United States 
 
Between 1975, the first year the EITC existed, and 2005, total spending on all 
means-tested cash and in-kind transfers in Table 1 averaged 2.0 percent of GDP, 
ranging between 1.8 and 2.5 percent. In 2005, it was 1.8 percent of GDP, near its 
31-year low. These patterns are driven by substantial changes in the antipoverty 
policy mix. Why has U.S. antipoverty spending been low and relatively stable 
given its persistent and high poverty rates? 
The contrast in levels in social expenditures between the United States and 
other OECD countries is striking.8 Smeeding calculates a consistent set of social 
expenditures (including cash, near-cash, and housing expenditures) as a 
percentage of GDP for five groups of counties—Scandinavia; Northern 
Continental Europe; Central and Southern Europe; “Anglo” (Australia, Canada, 
and the U.K.); and the United States—between 1980 and 1999.9 Spending ranges 
between 2.7 and 3.6 percent of GDP in the United States, a far lower level than 
every other country group. The other Anglo countries averaged between 4.8 and 
7.8 percent of GDP, similar to the Central and Southern European counties. 
Northern Europe and the Scandinavian countries averaged between 8.1 and 15.3 
percent of GDP. The trends across country groups vary, although most country 
groups increased expenditures as a share of GDP between 1980 and 1999. The 
United States did not. 
 
2.4. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
  
From 1935 until 1996, the centerpiece of the United States Federal Government 
(U.S.F.G.) welfare policy was a program entitled Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) whose principal benefit was the provision of cash assistance to 
needy families. In 1996, however, the U.S.F.G. dramatically shifted its poverty 
                                            
7  S.H. Danziger, “Fighting Poverty Revisited: What Did Researchers Know 40 Years Ago? 
What Do We Know Today?” Focus: Institute for Research on Poverty 25 (1) (2007): 9.  
8  See K. Caminada, and K.P. Goudswaard, “Effectiveness of Poverty Reduction in the EU: A 
Descriptive Analysis,” Poverty & Public Policy 1 (2), Article 5 (2009): 1-51; and K. 
Caminada, and K.P. Goudswaard, “Social Income Transfers and Poverty Alleviation OECD 
Countries,” Leiden University Research Memorandum Department of Economics #2010.01. 
9  T.M. Smeeding, “Poverty, Work, and Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective,” 
in Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, ed. David 
Grusky, Third Edition. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), 327-329. 
7
Martin and Caminada: Welfare Reform in the U.S.
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
reduction strategies by implementing large-scale social welfare reform aimed at 
making “welfare a transition to work” by officially becoming a temporary 
assistance program (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).10 
The legislative basis for the reform was the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA).11 PRWORA terminated the 
AFDC program.12 In place of AFDC, PRWORA introduced a new program 
known as Block Grants for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 
There are significant differences between TANF and the AFDC program 
that it supplanted in 1996. TANF marked a break from the policy objectives, 
eligibility rules, funding, time limitations, and work requirements under AFDC. 
The changes have had serious implications for the families who continue to 
receive benefits under TANF as well as for those families who no longer 
participate. In the United States today, 14 years after PRWORA was passed and 
TANF replaced AFDC, it is not clear that the reform has achieved the intended 
results.13 
While Europe and the United States have always had differences in their 
social safety net policies, the implementation of TANF, in place of AFDC, really 
marks the U.S. policy going in a drastically different direction than that taken in 
many European States. The remainder of this working paper details the most 
significant differences between AFDC and TANF. We begin by examining the 
underlying tenants and policy objectives of the two programs including the impact 
that increased U.S. State discretion has had on welfare in the United States. 
Following the policy overview, the paper surveys the literature evaluating the 
successes and failures of welfare reform. Finally, the paper considers some of 
welfare reform’s unintended consequences and the overall impact of welfare 
reform on the U.S.’s neediest families.  
                                            
10  Welfare reform included a series of policy changes through the passage of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. For this paper, we address welfare reform 
through a component of that Act, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and its 
relationship to the prior law, Aid to Families with Dependent Children. See, for details, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193), 1996. 
11  The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 included the Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families Block Grants as a component, which is the primary matter of 
discussion in this paper. However, the legislation’s passage also included almost 55 million 
dollars in cuts to low-income assistance programs including food stamps, benefits to legal 
immigrants, and the SSI program for children with disabilities. PRWORA also included a 
child support enforcement system as well as provided mandatory funds ($50 million annually) 
in abstinence education funding. 
12  TANF replaced not only AFDC, but also two accompanying programs, the Emergency 
Assistance Program and the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Program.  
13  Danziger, “Chapter 1 – Introduction. What Are the Early Lessons?”  
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3. POLICY OVERVIEW 
 
This section of the paper walks through the differences between Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. It 
begins with an overview of the two policies’ objectives, to provide some 
understanding about the significance of the move from a program that solely 
provides support to a program that also emphasizes work. The policy objectives 
section is followed by an overview of the major changes made when TANF 
replaced AFDC including the increased flexibility and discretion of States, the 
funding changes in moving from an entitlement to a block grant, the differences in 
eligibility requirements, the implementation of time limits, and the changes in 
work requirements. 
The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 was incredibly controversial. It was considered by 
many in the social policy and political communities to be too great a compromise 
with very conservative members of the United States Congress, even leading to 
the resignation of several presidential advisors and officials at the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services. One such advisor, former assistant 
secretary of children and families, Mary Jo Bane, in an article titled “Welfare as 
We Might Know It,” in The American Prospect (January/February 1997), stated, 
“The public, rightly, wanted welfare reform that expected work and parental 
responsibility. The political rhetoric supporting the new law, unfortunately, made 
the concept of a federal entitlement synonymous with irresponsibility and lifelong 
dependency, and the replacement of the entitlement with block grants 
synonymous with work requirements. This rhetoric was misleading but 
powerfully effective.”14  
 
3.1. Policy Objectives 
 
The underlying purpose of U.S.F.G. welfare policy has always been to reduce 
poverty by providing assistance to the country’s neediest families. While this 
fundamental mission remained unchanged following the welfare reform of 1996, 
the policy tools used to achieve that mission, and the programs implemented, 
changed significantly with the passage of PRWORA. The replacement of the 
country’s primary cash assistance program, from AFDC to TANF, represented not 
only a change in name, but a serious policy shift that revised poverty reduction 
strategies throughout the United States. 
                                            
14  D. Cabe, “Welfare to Work,” Kennedy School Bulletin, Harvard University, Boston, MA, 
2002. 
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AFDC was established through the Social Security Act of 1935. The 
policy’s objective was to reduce poverty through the provision of cash welfare to 
needy children suffering from lack of parental support due to their mother or 
father being incapacitated, deceased, absent from the home, or unemployed.15 
AFDC was accompanied by an employment training and education program 
called the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Program (JOBS) and an emergency 
cash assistance program called Emergency Assistance (EA).16 Although the 
funding for these programs was separate from AFDC funding, individuals could 
participate in the JOBS program only if they also participated in AFDC.17  
AFDC was administered and supervised by U.S. States but was strongly 
regulated according to guidelines issued by the U.S.F.G. The U.S.F.G. established 
eligibility rules for the AFDC program, while the individual U.S. States set their 
own benefit levels and established income and resource limits.18 AFDC benefit 
levels established by U.S. States were required to be uniformly applied to all 
families with similar circumstances within the State.19 
In 1996, under the Clinton Administration, the passage of PRWORA came 
with the promise to “change welfare as we know it.”20 The principal vehicle for 
achieving this change was the introduction of TANF to replace AFDC. TANF 
terminated open-ended welfare funding and instituted a block grant program 
providing each U.S. State, meeting certain criteria, with a fixed sum and increased 
flexibility in policy choice. AFDC was considered open-ended because U.S. 
States were entitled to reimbursement from the U.S.F.G. without a funding cap.21 
In contrast, TANF is administered as a block grant program in which U.S. States 
are provided with a determined amount of federal funding but allowed greater 
discretion over the way the funding is spent. As an ideological matter, whereas 
                                            
15  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview, 2004. 
16  The Emergency Assistance Program provided short-term emergency assistance to needy 
families. This assistance was not dependent upon participation in AFDC. 
17  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996. 
18  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview. 
19  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996. 
20  Urban Institute, Welfare Reform: Ten Years Later, Washington, DC, 2006. 
21  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview. 
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AFDC focused primarily on providing families with the means to survive, TANF 
emphasizes employment and makes welfare temporary in nearly all cases.22  
Through TANF U.S. States use U.S.F.G. block grants to operate their own 
programs. States can use TANF dollars in ways designed to meet any of the four 
policy objectives set out in the federal law, which are to: (1) provide assistance to 
needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the 
homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy parents on government 
benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and 
reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual 
numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; 
and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.23 
The shift from AFDC to TANF marked more than a move from an open-
ended cash-assistance program to a temporary-assistance program. TANF also 
introduced the practice of allowing welfare funding for programs aimed at 
influencing the family structure, including family planning and two-parent-family 
maintenance programs. This change reflects a shift in poverty reduction strategies 
in the United States. Whereas AFDC was designed to provide needy families with 
cash transfers that would supplement or replace employment income, TANF 
focused on the importance of work as well as attempting to foster nuclear families 
as a way to provide family economic stability.  
 
3.2. The Role of State Discretion 
 
PRWORA provided U.S. States with unprecedented discretion over welfare 
programming and funding. Under TANF, there are no federal rules that determine 
the amount of TANF cash benefits that must be paid to a participating family. 
Additionally, there are no federal rules that require U.S. States to use TANF to 
pay families cash benefits at all; however, all States do so.24 Benefit amounts are 
determined solely by the U.S. States. The discretion provided to States through 
TANF has allowed for a great diversity in the way that welfare programs are 
funded and administered across the country. Each U.S. State has different initial 
eligibility thresholds, benefit payment amounts, and fund allocations.25 
                                            
22  O.A. Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program 
to Assess Changing Social Policies (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2005). 
23  M. Covin, An Introduction to TANF (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, 2005). 
24  G. Falk, “The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to 
Frequently Asked Questions,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
Washington, DC, 2007. 
25  A State’s initial eligibility threshold considers all the State’s financial eligibility rules 
regarding applicants, the limitations placed on gross income, the rules for deductions from 
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 According to Falk of the Congressional Research Service (2007), in January 
of 2005, for the average cash welfare family (a family of three), the maximum 
monthly benefit in the median state was $389, with a range from $923 in Alaska 
to $170 in Mississippi.26 The maximum monthly cash benefit is usually paid to a 
family that receives no other income (no earned or unearned income) and who 
complies with program rules. Families with income other than TANF are often 
paid a reduced benefit amount. The diversity in program administration also 
extends to the initial eligibility threshold. Initial eligibility thresholds for families 
of three range from $1,641 in Hawaii to $269 in Alabama.27 
 State discretion has also created significant diversity in the way that TANF 
dollars are spent across the U.S. States particularly with reference to the level of 
cash benefits provided. The variation in the use of TANF funding spent on cash 
assistance ranges from 64 percent in Maine to only 12 percent in Illinois. 
Similarly, while several U.S. States decline to spend any of their TANF dollars on 
Family Formation programs such as encouraging two-parent families and 
decreasing out-of-wedlock births, New Jersey allocates 34.8 percent of its TANF 
dollars on Family Formation expenditures (Falk 2007).28  
 The discretion provided to U.S. States through the passage of the 1996 
welfare law allowed for a huge amount of variety in program and funds 
administration, with very few federal guidelines. Subsequently, there are different 
welfare programs being administered in every U.S. State. These programs are 
having mixed results in aiding the families who, currently or formerly, receive 
assistance through TANF and make it difficult to evaluate welfare reforms 
success as a whole.  
 Several commentators feared that TANF might set off a “race to the 
bottom,” where States, fearful of attracting low-income families from other 
States, might lower benefits, which in turn would cause other States to lower 
theirs. In fact, total AFDC/TANF spending on cash benefits declined from a peak 
of about $40 billion in 1995 to about $21 billion in 2006 (Table 1), but this 
reduction is roughly proportional to the welfare caseload reduction.29 
 
                                                                                                                       
gross income in determining net income, and any limitations placed on net income (The 
Urban Institute, 2004). Initial eligibility thresholds vary considerably across U.S. States. 
26  Falk, “The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently 
Asked Questions.”  
27  Welfare Rules Database, “Initial Income Eligibility Thresholds (Family of Three) by State,” 
Welfare Rules Database Data Set 1e4-2 (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2006). 
28   Falk, “The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently 
Asked Questions.”  
29  Scholz, Moffitt and Cowan, “Trends in Income Support,” 10. 
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3.3. Funding  
 
Under TANF, the funding relationship between the U.S.F.G. and the individual 
U.S. States changed. The drastically increased level of State discretion over 
federally granted funds changed the ways in which State governments were 
spending welfare dollars and the degree to which the U.S.F.G. was providing 
funding to the States. By allocating block grant funding to U.S. States, TANF 
removed almost all federal eligibility and payment rules and provided U.S. States 
with wide discretion over programming, as well as the right to deny benefits to 
families.30 
Under AFDC, U.S. States were entitled to unlimited federal funds. The 
federal government provided reimbursement of benefit payments at “matching” 
rates that were inversely related to a U.S. State’s per capita income.31 U.S. States 
were required to provide aid to all persons who were eligible under the federal 
law and whose income and resources were within the state-set limits.32  
Under TANF, however, there is no guarantee of benefit provision. 
PRWORA simply mandated a fixed budget amount that the U.S.F.G. would grant 
to the U.S. States each year (the base amount of the yearly block grant has been 
$16.5 billion since 1996).33 U.S. States are required to contribute, from their own 
funds, at least $10.4 billion in total under what is known as a “maintenance-of-
effort” (MOE) requirement. The 1996 law also created supplemental grants for 
certain States with high population growth or low block grant allocations relative 
to their needy population, as well as a contingency fund to help States during a 
recession.34 U.S. States that need or use more than the amount that has been 
granted for a particular year are not entitled to federal reimbursement for excess 
expenditures. Conversely, States that do not use all of their annual funding are 
allowed to carry over unused dollars from one fiscal year to the next.35  
The AFDC program was funded specifically and solely to provide cash 
assistance to needy families. The corresponding JOBS and EA programs 
                                            
30  R. Blank, “Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States. Revised,” Journal of Economic 
Literature 40 (4) (2002): 1-43.  
31  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview. 
32  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996. 
33  Congressional Budget Office, Federal Budget Implications of The Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Congressional Budget Office Memorandum, 2006. 
34  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families, 2009. 
35  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996. 
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supplemented AFDC by providing vocational training and short-term emergency 
program funding, respectively.36 Under TANF, however, States may direct federal 
funding toward any program that is within TANF’s objectives, including 
programming that would have formerly been funded through the JOBS or EA 
programs. In the absence of federally mandated cash assistance requirements, 
many U.S. States have opted to spend less on cash assistance and more on the 
other programming that falls under the provisions of TANF such as childcare, or 
work support programs. Thus, with the transition from AFDC to TANF the 
number of families receiving income assistance fell sharply. In 2003, most TANF 
funds, more than 60 percent, were spent on areas other than income assistance. In 
fiscal year 2007 the United States spent 30 billion dollars on TANF. (This number 
includes both the federal expenditure and the Maintenance of Effort (MOE) 
funding.) Only 30.2 percent of TANF dollars went toward providing families with 
cash assistance (28.4 percent to other services; 19.1 percent to child care; 12.4 
percent to other work support and employment programs; 8.3 percent to systems 
and administration; and 1.6 percent to transportation).37 
Annex C shows U.S. States variation in using TANF dollars. As a result, 
government aid across the nation varies remarkably; see Annex D. As millions of 
people seek aid, they are finding a complex system that reaches some and rejects 
others for “unpredictable” reasons. For example, the share of poor children and 
parents (below 100 percent of the poverty line) that receive cash welfare ranges 
from 2 percent in Idaho and Wyoming to over 45 percent in Maine, California, 
and Vermont—the U.S. average amounts to 21 percent. See Figure 2. 
To conclude, the increase in State discretion over the use of their federal 
welfare dollars has decreased the provision of cash assistance to needy families. 
U.S. States are opting to utilize federal funding to provide assistance to needy 
families through means other than direct cash transfers.  
 
                                            
36  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996. 
37  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families. 
14
Poverty & Public Policy, Vol. 3 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://www.psocommons.org/ppp/vol3/iss1/art8
DOI: 10.2202/1944-2858.1087
Figure 2. Share of Poor Children and Parents that Receive Cash Welfare, 2009 
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Source: Deparle and Ericson (2009). 
 
 
3.4. Eligibility 
 
Welfare reform also had a significant impact on eligibility for assistance. Under 
AFDC, the U.S.F.G. provided cash assistance along with education and training 
programming indefinitely so long as a family qualified under the eligibility 
criteria. One of the most striking ways that TANF limited eligibility was through 
the implementation of time limits; this aspect of eligibility is discussed in section 
3.5. In addition to establishing time limits, PRWORA tightened eligibility 
requirements both by providing U.S. States with the discretion to deny benefits 
and by reducing the base population who were eligible to receive federal 
assistance.  
Prior to welfare reform, persons meeting financial eligibility requirements 
under AFDC were provided cash benefits from the government. AFDC did not 
include restrictions based on marital status or citizenship. Minor, unwed mothers 
as well as persons convicted of drug-related crimes were provided unrestricted 
benefits under the former welfare program. Legally residing immigrants were also 
eligible for benefits under AFDC. There were no limits on the size of a family that 
could be eligible for AFDC benefits; therefore, when an additional child was 
born, families were provided with additional benefits.  
PRWORA imposed new conditions and restrictions to program 
participation. Since the passage of welfare reform, persons who have been 
convicted of a drug-related crime are prohibited for life from receiving benefits 
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under TANF. Unmarried minor parents are provided benefits only if living with 
an adult or if in an adult-supervised setting and participating in education and 
training programs.38 U.S. States were given the discretion to exclude both legal 
immigrants who were new applicants to welfare as well as the right to exclude 
even those legal immigrants already receiving assistance under the prior welfare 
program.39 While the federal guidelines under TANF do not limit eligibility based 
on family size, the policy does provide individual U.S. States with that 
discretion.40  
 
3.5. Time Limits 
 
The most notable eligibility change through the passage of PRWORA might be 
the implementation of time limits in establishing the duration for which a family 
can qualify for benefits. Under TANF, families who have received federally 
funded assistance for five cumulative years are ineligible for additional federal 
cash assistance. This means that even if employment adequate to provide family 
stability is not found, at the end of five cumulative years, families are removed 
from the program and can never again participate. 
AFDC’s designation as an entitlement program ensured that U.S. States 
would receive funding from the U.S.F.G. as long as the States adhered to the 
federal requirements. Benefits were then guaranteed to eligible participants in the 
AFDC program.41 Moreover, under AFDC, program participants remained 
eligible as long as they met the program’s established rules. Because there were 
no time restrictions to participation in AFDC, families remained eligible for cash 
assistance as long as they were below the initial eligibility threshold established 
by each individual U.S. State and continued to meet the program requirements 
issued by the U.S.F.G. and the U.S. State of residence.  
The establishment of time limits is one of the most consequential changes 
affecting families on welfare in the United States. The U.S. minimum wage plays 
a role in the ability of less-skilled workers to earn adequate incomes even if fully 
                                            
38  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996. 
39  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996. 
40  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview. 
41  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996. 
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employed.42 The inability to find employment at a living wage and maintain it 
while addressing health issues and child care have caused barriers for families in 
establishing financial security, particularly single-mother-headed households.43 In 
spite of these difficulties, welfare does not provide federal benefits to participants 
once the time limit has expired.44 TANF does not ensure that, after the program 
eligibility time limit is tolled, participating families have secured work that will 
enable them to provide basic necessities or even offset the cost of childcare or 
transportation that work often requires.  
 Moreover, recipients who reach the time limits or who are sanctioned for 
not finding a job are being denied cash assistance even though they are willing to 
work, because they cannot find any employer to hire them. This labor demand 
problem will increase during recessions and will remain even in good economic 
times because employer demands for a skilled workforce continue to escalate. 
Note that the “time limit and out” system differs markedly from a “time limit 
followed by a work-for-welfare opportunity of last resort” initially proposed by 
President Clinton’s advisors, but rejected by Congress.45 
 
3.6. Work Requirements and Activities 
 
Although education, work participation, and financial security were objectives of 
U.S. welfare policy both before and after welfare reform, the 1996 welfare reform 
placed greater responsibility on the families receiving program benefits to find 
stable and sufficiently paying work. To enable families to achieve this goal, 
TANF provided additional support targeted at finding and maintaining 
employment.  
Directly following welfare reform, U.S. States drastically altered their 
welfare programming to assist families in establishing employment. One such 
change made by U.S. States was a shift toward “work-first” welfare systems that 
reduced skills development and education programs while emphasizing job-
readiness and employment search training. U.S. States also moved toward 
                                            
42  According to the U.S. Department of Labor, the federal minimum wage is $6.55 per hour 
effective 24 July 2008. The federal minimum wage provisions are contained in the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. Many U.S. States also have minimum wage laws. In cases where an employee 
is subject to both the state and federal minimum wage laws, the employee is entitled to the 
higher of the two minimum wages. 
43  W.L. Primus, Rawlings, K. Larin, and K. Porter, The Initial Impact of Welfare Reform on the 
Economic Well-being of Single Mother Families (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities, 1999). 
44  States are allowed to exempt a minority of people from time limits and are allowed to 
continue paying benefits through State funds. 
45  S.H. Danziger, “Approaching the Limit: Early National Lessons from Welfare Reform,” PSC 
Research Report No. 02-507 (2002a). 
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“making work pay” through incentivizing work participation by raising eligibility 
thresholds or adding earned income tax credits. Additionally, U.S. States 
toughened sanctions and time limits to enforce the message that welfare would 
provide only temporary assistance.46 
Under AFDC, in fiscal year 1994, 40 percent of two-parent households 
receiving benefits were required to participate in 16 hours of work activity per 
week in order to continue participation in AFDC’s cash assistance program. 
Before the passage of PRWORA, the percentage of households required to meet 
the 16-hour work requirement was scheduled to increase to 75 percent in fiscal 
year 1997.47 In addition to the 16-hour requirement imposed on some participants, 
all AFDC recipients were required to participate in JOBS unless they were 
exempt from the program. A recipient would be exempt from JOBS participation 
if he or she worked for 30 hours or more per week, attended school full-time, 
cared for a very young child or elderly family member, or was under age 16. 
In contrast, under TANF, work participation standards require that the 
head of household in a single-parent family work at least 20 hours per week, and 
in the case of two-parent families, parents are required to work 30 hours per week 
in order to remain eligible for cash assistance. Eligible work includes subsidized 
or unsubsidized employment, on-the-job training, education programs, and 
community service. Hours spent in vocational education can count toward the 
weekly work requirement but only in a minority of U.S. States and only for a total 
of 12 months.48  
However, States are provided some flexibility in meeting their work 
requirements. The TANF statute requires U.S. States to have 50 percent of their 
caseload meet the established work participation standards. In addition to the 
aforementioned standards, there is a separate participation standard that applies to 
two-parent families, requiring 90 percent of the State’s two-parent family 
participants to meet work participation standards (Falk 2007). States that fail the 
TANF work participation standards are penalized by a reduction in their federal 
block grant amounts. However, the statutory work participation standards are 
reduced by a “caseload reduction credit.”49 The caseload reduction credit reduces 
                                            
46  Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to 
Assess Changing Social Policies. 
47  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996. 
48  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996. 
49  Although less than half of federal and state expenditures are associated with cash welfare, the 
“TANF caseload” number is the number of families and recipients receiving cash welfare. 
Information is not available on families and individuals who receive TANF benefits and 
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the participation standard by one percentage point for each percent decline in the 
caseload.50  
 
3.7. Summary 
 
Welfare reform and the implementation of TANF centered on the importance of 
work in providing families with economic stability. The policy intended to 
provide support through programming for five years, while participants were able 
to gain employment and attain economic security. This was intended to be 
accomplished through stricter eligibility, the implementation of time limits, and 
the increased flexibility for States to meet the needs of their poorest residents. The 
programs established to assist poor families with job preparation and workforce 
engagement have been the source of a significant amount of welfare reform’s 
praise. However, because programs vary from one U.S. State to the next, the 
degree to which the work-related programs assist families is also varied. The 
changes made in the move from AFDC to TANF shifted from a strong federal 
presence with entitled funding, to a strong state presence with block granted 
funding. The shift in the way welfare is funded and administered has led to 
various programs succeeding to varying degrees across the country.  
 
 
4. EVALUATING WELFARE REFORM 
 
Following the passage of PRWORA, U.S. social policy analysts and economists 
have surveyed the impact of welfare reform on helping needy families in the 
United States move out of poverty. This is a difficult task, due to the discretion 
provided to U.S. States through TANF and the resulting diversity in programming 
and implementation. There are varied opinions about TANF’s success in assisting 
the nation’s poorest families. Research institutions and universities have 
developed new and diverse proxies for examining the extent to which welfare 
reform has been successful in meeting the needs of low-income families in the 
United States as well as for identifying the reform’s failures.  
Often the reduced number of families receiving cash assistance through 
TANF is cited as evidence of the success of the 1996 welfare reform. Other 
frequently cited indications of success include the increase in employment rates 
                                                                                                                       
services other than cash welfare. In September 2006, 1.9 million families, consisting of 4.6 
million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded cash welfare. 
50  Falk, “The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently 
Asked Questions.”  
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and the decrease in child poverty that took place during the 1990s.51 However, 
this analysis only provides part of the information needed to evaluate the success 
of welfare reform in the United States. The following sections provide a review of 
data and literature evaluating welfare reform’s success in supporting families 
moving from welfare and into work, and ensuring employment and financial 
security for poor families in the United States. We attempt to cover some of the 
critical concerns of welfare reform, through a literature review organized by 
theme. The themes in this section include Employment Trends, The Effect of the 
Economy, The Very Poor and Single-Mother-Headed Households, Program 
Participation Rates, and TANF Benefits and Inflation. 
 
4.1. Employment Trends 
 
Some of the employment trends observed after welfare reform are positive. More 
welfare recipients are employed while receiving welfare benefits than they were 
in the past; increasing from 22 percent in 1997 to 33 percent in 1999. While these 
numbers have fallen in recent years, they have still not dropped to the levels that 
they were before welfare reform.52 However, a number of studies have found that 
even with increased work participation rates welfare and former welfare recipients 
are struggling to establish financial security.  
One of the primary goals of welfare reform was for participants to 
establish “stable, long-term work patterns,” under the assumption that regular 
involvement in work will improve their well-being. The justification for 
establishing only temporary assistance is that this approach provides support and 
impetus for families to become stably employed, which will be in the best interest 
of the participating families. Indeed, studies indicate that employment among 
former welfare recipients has actually increased since welfare reform was 
enacted, and that when recipients leave the TANF program their employment rate 
is 5 to 10 percent higher than when they left AFDC.53  
In the late 1990s, when families left the welfare system, they were more 
likely to have at least one working adult than they were prior to the 
implementation of TANF.54 However, in the tougher labor market of 2002 and 
2003, the proportion of former welfare recipients in the workforce fell from 63 
                                            
51  S. Parrott, and A. Sherman, TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed Than Often 
Understood (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2006). 
52  Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to 
Assess Changing Social Policies. 
53  S.K. Danziger, M.E. Corcoran, S.H. Danziger, and C.M. Heflin, “Work, Income and Material 
Hardship After Welfare Reform,” Journal of Consumer Affairs 34 (1) (2000): 6-30. 
54  Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to 
Assess Changing Social Policies. 
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percent in 1999 to 57 percent in 2002.55 Evaluations of welfare-to-work typically 
report that while most participants are able to secure initial employment, a large 
proportion, often a majority, lose those jobs within a year. Additionally, low 
wages among welfare recipients remain a concern. While recent research suggests 
that wages of former welfare recipients grow over time, this phenomenon occurs 
among only the minority of former recipients who are able to establish regular, 
stable full-time work patterns.56  
A study conducted by Danziger et al. found that the former welfare 
recipients with the most work participation and experience have higher levels of 
financial success and subjective well-being than those without employment.57 
However, they also found that there were a large number of respondents who 
suffered from financial hardship regardless of their level of work involvement. 
The study concluded that employment is associated with “reductions in, but not 
the elimination of, economic vulnerability and material hardships” for welfare and 
former welfare recipients in the United States. 
 
4.2. The Effect of the Economy 
 
The fact that PRWORA was passed during a time of rapid and sustained 
economic growth complicates efforts to determine the extent to which certain 
phenomena such as increased employment and decreased poverty levels can 
properly be attributed to welfare policy reform. In the United States between 1992 
and 2000, the labor market increased by 20 million jobs.58 The U.S. 
unemployment rate fell to 5 percent in early 1997, and remained at or below that 
level until October of 2001.59 Many businesses experienced worker shortages in 
the years following the passage of the 1996 legislation, making employers 
increasingly open to hiring ex-welfare recipients. Additionally, wages among 
less-skilled and less-educated workers started to rise in 1995, for the first time 
since the late 1970s. 
During this time, less-educated, single mothers increasingly joined the 
workforce; whereas 62 percent of this population was employed in 1995, by 2000, 
                                            
55  Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to 
Assess Changing Social Policies. 
56  Danziger et al., “Work, Income and Material Hardship After Welfare Reform.”  
57  Danziger et al., “Work, Income and Material Hardship After Welfare Reform.”  
58  R. Blank, “Fighting Poverty: Lessons from Recent US History,” Distinguished lecture on 
economics in government, delivered to a joint session of the Society of Government 
Economists and the American Economic Association at the annual meetings of the ASSA, 
Boston, MA, 2000. 
59  Blank, “Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States. Revised.” 
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73 percent were working.60 While this is impressive growth, the extent to which it 
can be attributed to welfare reform remains ambiguous. Welfare reform policies 
might have increased the number of women in the workforce through job training 
and work incentives, but it is unclear to what degree the increase was a result of 
policy, and to what degree it was the result of a strong economy.61  
Recent evidence suggests that the economic expansion of the mid- to late 
1990s may account for a significant percentage of the positive trends observed 
among needy families during this time. While the booming economy of the 1990s 
correlated with a decrease in child poverty and an increase in low-educated single 
parents joining the workforce, those numbers have begun to drop in recent years 
following the recession in 2003.62 Moreover, attributing the successes of the mid-
1990s to the implementation of TANF is also improbable for the reason that to do 
so would suggest that the 1996 reform yielded almost immediate results. Kaushal 
et al. suggest that given that some policies might have delayed results, it is 
difficult to attribute the success of the 1990s solely to welfare reform and the 
implementation of TANF.63  
  
4.3. The Very Poor and Single-Mother-Headed Households 
 
While welfare reform, along with a robust and incredibly successful economy, 
may have initially decreased child poverty and increased some employment rates, 
the reform had an unintended and significant negative effect on the very poor. 
Haskins found that “there is a small to moderate-sized group of mother-headed 
families that are worse off than they were before welfare reform.”64 Shortly after 
TANF was implemented, the nation’s poorest families were not benefiting from 
the success of the economy or the policies of welfare reform. Primus et al. found 
that from 1995 to 1997 disposable income for the poorest 20 percent of the 
population declined by 7.6 percent and the poorest 10 percent of the population 
experienced a 15.2 percent decline in discretionary income.65 
                                            
60  N. Kaushal, Q. Gao, and J. Waldfogal, “Welfare Reform and Family Expenditures: How are 
Single Mothers Adapting to the New Welfare and Work Regime?” National Poverty Center 
Working Paper Series 0607, 2006. 
61  Blank, “Fighting Poverty: Lessons from Recent US History.” 
62  A. Sherman, S. Fremstad, and S. Parrott, Employment Rates for Single Mothers Fell 
Substantially during Recent Period of Labor Market Weakness (Washington, DC: Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities, 2004). 
63  Kaushal et al., “Welfare Reform and Family Expenditures: How are Single Mothers Adapting 
to the New Welfare and Work Regime?” 
64  R. Haskins, “Effects of Welfare Reform on Family Income and Poverty,” in The New World 
of Welfare, eds. R. Blank and R. Haskins (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
2000).  
65  Primus et al., The Initial Impact of Welfare Reform on the Economic Well-being of Single 
Mother Families. 
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Following welfare reform, the number of single mothers in the United 
States who were receiving cash assistance through TANF fell by two million. 
However, employment among single mothers grew by only one million. 
Therefore, in the United States there were one million unemployed single mothers 
who were not receiving any cash assistance from the government. This number is 
almost double what it was before welfare reform (up from 6,000,000).66 The size 
of this group grew from 9.8 percent of participants leaving the program in 1999 to 
13.8 percent in 2002.67 The population of single mothers who are disconnected 
from both employment and government cash assistance is significantly more 
likely to be in poor physical and mental health as well as less ready for 
employment than those who left welfare for job opportunities.68  
A qualitative study conducted on TANF recipients in Maine analyzed the 
barriers to employment that prevented single mothers from being able to establish 
and maintain work. The study, by Butler, looked at women who were 
participating in the TANF program but who were struggling to maintain stable 
employment.69 Butler’s study identified several social and health issues that 
prevented the women in her study from achieving steady employment. The three 
most prevalent phenomena observed were domestic violence, raising children 
with disabilities, and long-term physical and mental health problems (the latter 
affecting 33-44 percent of TANF recipients nation-wide). Butler also found that 
not only are welfare recipients disproportionately affected by these issues, but 
often must cope with more than one simultaneously.  
  
4.4. Program Participation Rates 
 
Reduced program participation is often presented as evidence that welfare reform 
is working to move people out of poverty. However, there are concerns with using 
reduced welfare caseloads as a proxy for welfare reform’s success. While 
increased work involvement has certainly accounted for reduced participation in 
the TANF program, Parrott and Sherman point out that, despite the reduction in 
caseloads, in recent years the number of children living below half of the poverty 
line has grown significantly.70 While the number of families in this category has 
increased, the rate at which eligible families are receiving TANF benefits has 
declined. Even when considering noncash benefits such as food assistance, the 
                                            
66  Parrott and Sherman, TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed Than Often Understood. 
67  Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to 
Assess Changing Social Policies. 
68  Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to 
Assess Changing Social Policies. 
69  S. Butler, “Long-Term TANF Participants and Barriers to Employment: A Qualitative Study 
in Maine,” Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare XXXV (3) (September 2008). 
70  Parrott and Sherman, TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed Than Often Understood. 
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number of children in families living below half of the poverty line has grown 
significantly.71 
This increased deep poverty (people living below 50 percent of the 
poverty line) is a concerning trend. While child poverty remains below the levels 
that were seen in the years immediately preceding the welfare reform of 1996, the 
growing rates of intense poverty raise doubts about TANF’s ability to reach the 
most impoverished families. Before the 1996 welfare reform, the AFDC program 
lifted 64 percent of otherwise deeply poor children out of deep poverty. 
Conversely, in 2005, the TANF program lifted just 23 percent of deeply poor 
children above 50 percent of the poverty line.72 TANF programming does not 
seem to be addressing the needs of the poorest families in the United States, 
which is evidenced through both the increase in deep poverty and the rates at 
which this population is participating in TANF.  
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program73 and the Medicaid 
Program, which provide food stamps and healthcare, respectively, have continued 
to assist a growing number of low-income families, while TANF participation has 
continued to drop.74 The Congressional Budget Office reports that unlike the 
trends seen in program participation in TANF, the other four major poverty 
reduction initiatives have seen significant growth in participation over the last 
several years.75 Moreover, as of 2003, each of these programs served more low-
income families than did TANF. In addition to serving more people than the 
major welfare legislation, the U.S.F.G. also provides more funding for the other 
four major poverty reduction programs. In 2005, the federal government spent 
$22 billion on TANF, compared with $30 billion on Food Assistance, $39 billion 
on Supplemental Security Income benefits, and $45 billion for the Earned Income 
Tax Credit; see Annex A. 
The number of families who are eligible to participate in TANF, but who 
do not, is remarkably high not only with reference to participation in other 
poverty reduction programs, but also when compared with AFDC. According to 
                                            
71  S.H. Danziger, “After Welfare Reform and an Economic Boom: Why is Child Poverty Still 
So Much Higher in the U.S. than in Europe?” in Children and Social Security, ed. J. 
Bradshaw (London: Ashgate, 2002b), 3-35. 
72  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families. 
73   Commonly referred to as food stamps. Gross monthly income eligibility limits are set at 130 
percent of the poverty level for the household size. Net monthly income limits are set at 100 
percent of poverty (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, 2009a; 
2009b). Participation in the food stamps program is not taken into account when measuring a 
household’s poverty, as food stamps are not a cash benefit. Following the 1996 Welfare 
Reform, participation in this program includes a work requirement. 
74  Parrott and Sherman, TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed Than Often Understood. 
75  Congressional Budget Office, Changes in Participation of Means Tested Programs, 2005. 
24
Poverty & Public Policy, Vol. 3 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://www.psocommons.org/ppp/vol3/iss1/art8
DOI: 10.2202/1944-2858.1087
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in 2005 only 40 percent of 
families who were eligible for TANF assistance participated in the program.76 
This is a significant change. Prior to welfare reform, more than 80 percent of 
families that qualified for AFDC participated in the program. Moreover, a simple 
linear trend shows that participation of AFDC/TANF decreased over 4 points 
each year in the period 1993-2005. See Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Rates of Participation in AFDC and TANF by Families that Meet 
Eligibility Requirements 
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Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Indicators of Welfare 
Dependence) (2008). 
 
 
Thus, the decline in welfare caseloads, a figure frequently marshaled as 
proof of welfare reform’s success, does not indicate that low-income families are 
more financially successful and stable than they were before welfare reform, but 
rather that poor families are simply not participating in the program. As stated by 
Parrott and Sherman: “More than half—57 percent—of the decline in TANF 
caseloads since 1996 is due to a decline in the extent to which TANF programs 
serve families that are poor enough to qualify, rather than to a reduction in the 
number of families who are poor enough to qualify for aid.”77 
 
                                            
76  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Annual report to Congress. Indicators of 
Welfare Dependence, 2008. 
77  Parrott and Sherman, TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed Than Often Understood. 
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4.5. TANF Benefits and Inflation 
 
There are also significant concerns about the degree of help that TANF is 
providing to the families who are participating in the program. The basic TANF 
block grant that the U.S.F.G. makes available has been set at $16.5 billion since it 
was established in 199678 (Table 2). As a result, the real value of the block grant 
has already fallen by about 27 percent.79 In addition, 23 U.S. States have 
maintained the same benefit level since fiscal year 2000 without making 
adjustments for inflation.  
 
Table 2. Basic TANF Block Grant in Constant FY1997 Dollars 
 
Fiscal Year Value of the Block Grant in 
Billions of FY1997 Dollars 
Cumulative Loss in Value 
(in percent) 
1997 16.5 — 
1998 16.2 −2 
1999 15.9 −3 
2000 15.4 −6 
2001 14.9 −9 
2002 14.7 −11 
2003 14.4 −13 
2004 14.1 −15 
2005 13.6 −17 
2006 13.1 −20 
2007 12.9 −22 
2008 12.6 −24 
2009 12.3 −25 
2010 12.1 −27 
 
Notes:  Constant dollars were computed using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U). 
Actual inflation was used to compute constant dollars for FY1997 through FY2006 using data from 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Constant dollars for FY2007 through FY2010 are based on the 
inflation assumptions of the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), published in January 2007.  
 
Source: Falk Report for the Congressional Research Service (2007). 
 
 
                                            
78  Falk, “The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently 
Asked Questions.” 
79  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families. 
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A study by Schott and Levinson found that TANF benefits have declined 
in real (inflation-adjusted dollars) in nearly every U.S. State since the passage of 
PRWORA.80 The same study found that even those U.S. States that have adjusted 
benefit levels upwards under TANF have not kept pace with the increased costs of 
basic needs. When adjusting for inflation using the Consumer Price Index, 48 
States have lower real dollar benefit levels now than they did in 1996 when TANF 
was enacted. In the 19 States where TANF benefits have remained the same since 
welfare reform, TANF benefits in 2009 are worth 25 percent less, in inflation-
adjusted terms, than they were in 1996. In other words, TANF benefits do less to 
help families rise out of extreme poverty than they did in 1996. In 2008, 20 States 
had benefit levels below 25 percent of the federal poverty line, which is nearly 
twice as many states as had benefits below 25 percent of the poverty line in 1996 
when TANF replaced AFDC. The families who are participating in TANF are 
receiving benefits that do little to help them move out of poverty and the rate to 
which it is helping is decreasing.  
 
4.6. Summary 
 
While there are some indications that TANF had a positive impact on the 
employment patterns of former welfare recipients, there are also strong 
indications that the economy played a significant role in the availability of jobs. In 
tough economic times TANF is ill-prepared to address the needs of the growing 
number of people living in poverty. While the extent to which each state program 
is serving its populations varies greatly, there are some themes which can be 
established nationally: There have been negative findings in the program’s 
effectiveness in serving the very poor and single-mother-headed households; 
participation rates have gone down—even among those who remain eligible for 
the program; and inflation has led to a decline in program benefits leading to the 
reduced ability to serve needy families.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
When PRWORA was passed in 1996, it might have been the ideal time for 
welfare reform for political and pragmatic reasons. On the political side, there was 
a growing sentiment that AFDC was creating a population of welfare recipients 
that relied primarily on the government for financial support. With regard to the 
                                            
80  Z. Schott, and L. Levinson, TANF Benefits Are Low And Have Not Kept Pace With Inflation: 
But Most States Have Increased Benefits Above a Freeze Level in Recent Years (Washington, 
DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2008). 
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feasibility of reform, the economic climate at the time was such that there were 
more opportunities for less-skilled and low-income workers to secure 
employment at better wages than had been available in the past. Against this 
background, welfare caseloads fell dramatically after the mid-1990s. Some of this 
decline is undoubtedly due to welfare reform, some to nonwelfare policy changes, 
some to the booming economy, and some to the interactions among them. 
However, it is a difficult task to evaluate U.S. welfare reform, because with the 
passage of PRWORA and the increase in U.S. State discretion, there are different 
programs, eligibility requirements, and benefit amounts in every U.S. State. We 
found huge variation across U.S. States, depending on ability to pay and 
preferences to meet a certain level of social standard and other (social) objectives 
such as child care, family maintenance, and work support and employment 
programs.  
The 1996 welfare reform highlights America’s emphasis on work. 
PRWORA represented a shift in the way the United States attempts to address 
poverty, as well as a general change in the philosophy about how poverty 
reduction strategies should be implemented. Although welfare reform increased 
work, the earnings of most individuals who left welfare are still below the poverty 
line, even many years after their exit. Another drawback of this work-first 
approach is the termination of cash assistance after five years, especially for 
vulnerable groups with low skills. In the wake of the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005 (which altered spending on a number of social service programs) States are 
beginning to provide low-income families, even those families who have left the 
TANF program, with additional resources.81 These resources are often designed to 
create incentives to work by providing supplemental payments to families’ 
employment-earned household income. Since the passage of the Deficit 
Reduction Act in 2005, one third of U.S. States have established supplemental 
support programs, with various eligibility rules and benefit amounts.82  
Still, 14.3 percent of the U.S. population was living in poverty in 2009 
(approximately 43.6 million people). This number is only climbing in the current 
economic crisis, and while TANF is due for reauthorization, it will likely be 
extended. However, the opportunity to address TANF’s “shortfalls” will likely 
come in the near future. Our interpretation of the literature is that welfare reform 
policies (TANF) had limited success in reducing poverty. With the current 
                                            
81  The welfare reform law was reauthorized by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 and extended 
until 2010. The Deficit Reduction Act was intended to reduce mandatory (entitlement) federal 
spending (Medicare, Medicaid, Food Stamps, farm subsidies, etc.) through changes in 
program requirements set by revised or new federal laws. In some cases it allows for spending 
on new programming by providing more state discretion on programs and spending.  
82  Schott and Levinson, TANF Benefits Are Low And Have Not Kept Pace With Inflation: But 
Most States Have Increased Benefits Above a Freeze Level in Recent Years. 
28
Poverty & Public Policy, Vol. 3 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://www.psocommons.org/ppp/vol3/iss1/art8
DOI: 10.2202/1944-2858.1087
troubled economy and shrinking job market, low-income families need 
significantly more support. Supplemental cash assistance programs and education 
and job training that aid less-skilled workers in both finding and sustaining 
employment will be necessary for welfare reform in the United States to be 
successful in reducing poverty and supporting families in difficult economic 
times. If moving people from welfare to work is the goal of U.S. welfare policy, it 
is important to ensure that a living wage can be obtained through work, and that 
the costs of childcare and transportation do not exceed the income gained through 
employment. Automatically adjusting the U.S. minimum wage for inflation 
annually might be one complementary policy change that would serve to support 
working families facing these challenges. Moreover, one could argue that 
recipients who reach time limits without meeting work requirements should be 
offered a chance to work in community service jobs in return for cash 
assistance.83  
When TANF is reauthorized, it is important that the funding allocated is 
appropriate for the program’s scope. Additionally, TANF’s goals should be 
clarified; TANF’s role as both a work program and the primary source of support 
for the most impoverished families is not realistic given the program’s resources. 
If TANF is to remain a program that addresses the needs of the poorest families in 
the United States through supplemental income, work, and family supports, it is 
critical that we address these needs adequately. TANF, as a critical component of 
the U.S. safety net, must be flexible in meeting the needs of the most 
disadvantaged families in the most difficult economic times. The past recession 
provided challenges to the program and it responded unevenly.84 Finally, for 
TANF to continue to be a key piece of the U.S. effort to reduce poverty, it must 
be measured accordingly. Instead of measuring caseloads, it needs to include 
performance measures that would allow for States to be evaluated on how well 
they are serving families, not just to determine the reduction in families receiving 
benefits.  
 
                                            
83  S.H. Danziger, and S.K. Danziger, “The U.S. Social Safety Net and Poverty: Lessons 
Learned and Promising Approaches,” PSC Research Report No. 05-580 (2005), 10.  
84  L. Pavetti, and D. Rosenbaum, Creating a Safety Net that Works When the Economy 
Doesn’t: The Role of the Food Stamp and TANF Programs (Washington, DC: Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities, 2010). 
29
Martin and Caminada: Welfare Reform in the U.S.
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
Annex A:  Total Means-tested Benefits by Program, 1970-2007 (constant 2007 
dollars, millions) 
 
 Medicaid SSI AFDC/
TANF 
EITC Food 
Stamps 
Housing 
Aid 
School Food 
Programs 
WIC Head 
Start 
1970 28,264 15,706 26,522  2,938 2,693 3,631  1,740 
1971 34,281 16,413 30,728  7,796 3,922 4,711  1,843 
1972 41,235 16,825 35,337  8,915 5,734 5,784  1,867 
1973 44,004 15,962 35,552  9,953 7,710 6,251  1,871 
1974 46,574 22,063 34,113  11,432 7,671 6,350 44 1,699 
1975 51,820 22,653 36,589 4,817 16,901 8,197 7,405 344 1,557 
1976 55,348 22,104 39,154 4,719 19,410 9,125 7,879 520 1,607 
1977 59,753 21,576 39,569 3,856 17,337 10,288 8,245 876 1,625 
1978 61,904 20,836 37,649 3,333 16,343 11,700 8,484 1,207 1,988 
1979 63,779 20,206 34,640 5,860 18,507 12,292 8,834 1,501 1,942 
1980 65,504 19,982 33,806 4,997 21,944 13,789 9,101 1,831 1,849 
1981 69,132 19,601 33,058 4,361 24,247 15,650 8,459 1,988 1,867 
1982 68,780 19,297 31,398 3,814 21,934 17,326 7,043 2,039 1,959 
1983 73,413 19,577 32,136 3,737 23,216 19,670 7,419 2,344 1,899 
1984 76,297 20,698 32,067 3,269 21,345 20,052 7,414 2,770 1,987 
1985 78,884 21,312 31,523 4,024 20,703 21,971 7,274 2,870 2,072 
1986 85,856 22,855 32,530 3,801 20,063 21,644 7,488 2,995 1,968 
1987 91,878 23,638 33,686 6,189 19,165 20,585 7,570 3,066 2,063 
1988 96,538 25,195 33,329 10,334 19,541 22,306 7,415 3,150 2,114 
1989 103,592 24,592 32,869 11,028 19,513 23,374 7,192 3,195 2,065 
1990 116,856 25,533 34,929 11,965 22,436 24,559 7,054 3,367 2,462 
1991 141,898 27,370 36,739 16,906 26,360 25,816 7,503 3,503 2,971 
1992 159,884 31,416 39,320 19,253 30,895 27,748 7,929 3,843 3,254 
1993 175,594 34,686 38,795 22,294 31,576 30,702 8,089 4,059 3,984 
1994 188,054 39,577 40,369 29,527 31,827 33,303 8,384 4,434 4,653 
1995 197,086 38,263 40,939 35,313 30,971 37,330 8,469 4,675 4,808 
1996 201,091 36,247 37,257 38,092 29,654 35,231 8,577 4,883 4,717 
1997 204,730 38,911 29,944 39,258 25,254 35,775 8,766 4,966 5,142 
1998 214,967 39,629 27,365 41,138 21,485 36,490 9,055 4,949 5,530 
1999 229,230 40,016 27,042 39,702 19,626 34,406 9,187 4,901 5,797 
2000 242,736 42,689 27,221 38,887 18,041 34,663 9,099 4,795 6,342 
2001 263,782 36,856 28,284 39,075 18,202 35,201 9,297 4,863 7,259 
2002 287,003 41,456 26,920 44,026 21,041 38,087 9,722 5,002 7,534 
2003 306,092 39,094 25,756 43,561 24,120 39,785 9,979 5,098 7,513 
2004 320,552 39,586 22,900 43,931 27,022 40,145 10,335 5,364 7,436 
2005 332,818 39,532 21,972 45,025 30,329 40,035 10,589 5,301 7,265 
2006 319,476 39,997 21,052  31,047 39,084 10,542 5,217 6,979 
2007         30,373 39,436 10,891 5,450   
 
Abbreviations: Medicaid = medical assistance for aged, blind, disabled, certain pregnant women, or dependent 
children; SSI = Supplemental Security Income (federally administered cash assistance for aged, blind, and 
disabled); AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children; TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; 
EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit; WIC = Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children. 
 
Source: Scholz et al. (2008, 48-49). 
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Annex B:  Number of Recipients Means-tested Benefits by Program, 1970-2007 
(thousands) 
 
 Medicaid SSI AFDC/
TANF 
EITC Food 
Stamps 
Housing 
Aid 
School 
Breakfast 
School 
Lunch 
WIC Head 
Start 
1970     8,466   4,340   450 22,400   477 
1971    10,241  9,368  800 24,100  398 
1972 17,606  10,947  11,109  1,040 24,400  379 
1973 19,622  10,949  12,166  1,190 24,700  379 
1974 21,462 3,996 10,864  12,862  1,370 24,600 88 353 
1975 22,007 4,314 11,346 6,215 17,064  1,820 24,900 344 349 
1976 22,815 4,236 11,304 6,473 18,549  2,200 25,600 520 349 
1977 22,832 4,238 11,050 5,627 17,077 2,398 2,490 26,200 848 333 
1978 21,965 4,217 10,570 5,192 16,001 2,643 2,800 26,700 1,181 391 
1979 21,520 4,150 10,312 7,135 17,653 2,842 3,320 27,000 1,483 388 
1980 21,605 4,142 10,774 6,954 21,082 3,032 3,600 26,600 1,914 376 
1981 21,980 4,019 11,079 6,717 22,430 3,431 3,810 25,800 2,119 387 
1982 21,603 3,858 10,258 6,395 21,717 3,619 3,320 22,900 2,189 396 
1983 21,554 3,901 10,761 7,368 21,625 3,857 3,360 23,000 2,537 415 
1984 21,607 4,029 10,831 6,376 20,854 4,081 3,430 23,400 3,045 442 
1985 21,814 4,138 10,855 7,432 19,899 4,225 3,440 23,600 3,138 452 
1986 22,515 4,269 11,038 7,156 19,429 4,336 3,500 23,700 3,312 452 
1987 23,109 4,385 11,027 8,738 19,113 4,461 3,610 23,900 3,429 447 
1988 22,907 4,464 10,915 11,148 18,645 4,530 3,680 24,200 3,593 448 
1989 23,511 4,593 10,993 11,696 18,806 4,632 3,810 24,200 4,119 451 
1990 25,255 4,817 11,695 12,542 20,049 4,710 4,070 24,100 4,517 541 
1991 28,280 5,118 12,930 13,665 22,625 4,786 4,440 24,200 4,893 583 
1992 30,926 5,566 13,773 14,097 25,407 4,830 4,920 24,600 5,403 621 
1993 33,432 5,984 14,205 15,117 26,987 4,959 5,360 24,900 5,921 714 
1994 35,053 6,296 14,161 19,017 27,474 5,035 5,830 25,300 6,477 740 
1995 36,282 6,514 13,418 19,334 26,619 5,130 6,320 25,700 6,894 751 
1996 36,118 6,614 12,321 19,464 25,543 5,104 6,580 25,900 7,186 752 
1997 34,872 6,495 10,376 19,391 22,858 5,132 6,920 26,300 7,407 794 
1998 40,649 6,566 8,347 20,273 19,791 5,082 7,140 26,600 7,367 822 
1999 40,300 6,557 6,824 19,259 18,183 5,154 7,370 27,000 7,311 826 
2000 42,887 6,602 5,778 19,277 17,194 5,104 7,550 27,300 7,192 858 
2001 46,164 6,688 5,359 19,593 17,318 5,123 7,790 27,500 7,306 905 
2002 49,329 6,788 5,064 21,703 19,096 5,268 8,150 28,000 7,491 912 
2003 51,971 6,902 4,929 22,024 21,259 5,231 8,430 28,400 7,631 910 
2004 55,002 6,988 4,745 22,270 23,858 5,172 8,900 29,000 7,904 906 
2005   7,114 4,492 22,752 25,718 5,139 9,360 29,600 8,023 907 
2006   7,236   26,672 5,192 9,770 30,100 8,088 909 
2007        26,466 5,108 10,160 30,600 8,285   
 
Abbreviations: Medicaid = medical assistance for aged, blind, disabled, certain pregnant women, or dependent 
children; SSI = Supplemental Security Income (federally administered cash assistance for aged, blind, and 
disabled); AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children; TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; 
EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit; WIC = Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children. 
 
Source: Scholz et al. (2008, 50-51). 
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Annex C:  U.S. State Use of TANF and MOE Funds as a Percent of Total Federal TANF and State MOE Funding, 
fiscal year 2005 
 
 Cash Assistance Admin 
Work 
Program Child Care 
Transfer to 
CCDF 
Other Work 
Supports 
Family 
Formation Other 
Transfer to 
SSBG 
 
Alabama 34 9 11 5 3 3 1 26 8 
Alaska 44 6 13 14 16 1 1 2 3 
Arizona 50 12 6 3 0 1 0 21 7 
Arkansas 24 10 16 19 10 7 3 7 3 
California 55 9 7 10 6 2 0 8 2 
Colorado 33 9 1 1 1 4 0 46 7 
Connecticut 26 6 5 3 0 4 15 36 6 
Delaware 32 10 0 40 -7 21 0 0 4 
Florida 18 9 8 23 12 1 1 24 6 
Georgia 22 4 16 4 0 3 6 43 3 
Hawaii 55 10 14 7 7 1 0 0 7 
Idaho 15 4 15 2 18 1 5 38 3 
Illinois 12 2 8 41 0 2 0 33 2 
Indiana 36 13 2 5 2 13 1 29 1 
Iowa 38 7 9 3 13 2 4 18 6 
Kansas 36 5 1 4 12 20 0 19 2 
Kentucky 39 6 10 8 20 2 0 15 0 
Louisiana 23 12 6 2 9 4 23 14 7 
Maine 64 4 2 10 6 9 0 2 4 
Maryland 33 10 8 8 0 27 6 2 6 
Massachusetts 40 3 2 22 11 9 0 7 6 
Michigan 31 7 6 17 10 0 8 19 3 
Minnesota 33 11 17 10 6 14 0 10 0 
Mississippi 25 5 14 5 18 12 7 6 9 
Missouri 36 6 9 18 8 0 2 15 6 
Montana 42 11 24 3 4 0 1 12 4 
Nebraska 62 7 14 8 10 0 0 0 0 
Nevada 47 23 2 6 0 8 1 13 2 
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  Cash 
Assistance 
Admin Work 
Program 
Child Care Transfer to 
CCDF 
Other Work 
Supports 
Family 
Formation 
Other Transfer to 
SSBG 
 
New Hampshire 49 10 12 6 8 2 2 7 5 
New Jersey 44 8 5 3 0 5 35 0 2 
New Mexico 47 5 8 2 19 1 1 17 1 
New York 39 9 5 2 9 17 1 16 3 
North Carolina 20 7 12 22 16 1 0 21 1 
North Dakota 33 10 8 7 0 4 7 31 0 
Ohio 30 12 7 21 0 2 1 20 7 
Oklahoma 15 7 0 28 14 12 2 15 7 
Oregon 39 10 8 4 0 6 0 33 0 
Pennsylvania 31 7 14 10 9 3 2 22 2 
Rhode Island 41 8 4 29 5 0 0 13 1 
South Carolina 29 8 22 2 1 3 3 24 8 
South Dakota 36 9 11 3 0 0 2 34 7 
Tennessee 40 10 9 10 19 2 0 7 3 
Texas 20 13 9 3 0 0 1 47 7 
Utah 41 18 28 9 0 1 0 1 3 
Vermont 44 8 1 10 11 18 0 1 6 
Virginia 47 15 17 7 1 2 0 6 5 
Washington 41 7 15 11 16 1 0 8 1 
West Virginia 32 19 2 15 0 7 11 6 8 
Wisconsin 22 7 6 32 12 12 3 3 3 
Wyoming 19 3 1 8 10 7 0 52 0 
 
U.S. (un-weighted 
average States) 35 9 9 11 7 6 3 17 4 
 
Abbreviations: MOE = States are required to contribute, from their own funds, at least $10.4 billion in total under what is known as a “maintenance-of-effort” 
(MOE) requirement. Admin = Administrative Expenditures; CCFD =Child Care and Development Fund; SSBG = Social Service Block Grant. 
 
Source:  Falk (2008). Congressional Research Service based on data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. 
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Annex D: Variations in U.S. Government Aid Across the Nation, 2009 
 
 Share of Poor 
Children and Parents 
that Receive Cash 
Welfare a 
Share of 
Unemployed that 
Receive Benefits 
Share of Eligible 
Households that 
Receive Housing 
Benefits 
Share of Eligible 
People that Receive 
Food Stamps 
Share of Uninsured 
Poor Adults Covered 
by Government 
Programs a 
Share of Uninsured 
Low-income Children 
Covered by 
Government Programs b 
 
Alabama 10 41 38 66 45 83 
Alaska 24 51 26 63 36 81 
Arizona 18 35 19 61 43 67 
Arkansas 7 55 34 77 33 83 
California 47 43 21 50 37 73 
Colorado 8 26 23 54 30 57 
Connecticut 31 51 34 65 54 78 
Delaware 22 58 34 73 53 71 
Florida 7 38 23 62 30 56 
Georgia 6 36 33 68 36 73 
Hawaii 25 50 26 72 49 83 
Idaho 2 67 29 57 44 73 
Illinois 9 43 30 79 38 77 
Indiana 29 46 32 74 43 83 
Iowa 28 49 35 71 48 86 
Kansas 23 37 34 59 43 82 
Kentucky 15 36 38 78 45 81 
Louisiana 5 32 39 75 37 76 
Maine 46 37 41 96 69 86 
Maryland 25 45 32 60 37 69 
Massachusetts 38 64 35 61 63 86 
Michigan 32 46 31 80 50 86 
Minnesota 35 42 37 69 54 75 
Mississippi 7 32 42 63 39 72 
Missouri 29 35 33 98 45 79 
Montana 11 52 32 62 43 70 
Nebraska 24 40 33 67 40 75 
Nevada 14 49 17 54 25 51 
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 Share of Poor 
Children and Parents 
that Receive Cash 
Welfare a 
Share of 
Unemployed that 
Receive Benefits 
Share of Eligible 
Households that 
Receive Housing 
Benefits 
Share of Eligible 
People that Receive 
Food Stamps 
Share of Uninsured 
Poor Adults Covered by 
Government Programs a 
Share of Uninsured 
Low-income Children 
Covered by Government 
Programs b 
 
New Hampshire 28 37 34 68 38 76 
New Jersey 27 67 28 60 33 62 
New Mexico 17 49 31 71 39 69 
New York 32 48 32 63 55 81 
North Carolina 7 46 29 67 42 73 
North Dakota 22 33 37 57 43 70 
Ohio 23 37 33 70 50 81 
Oklahoma 6 29 32 69 31 77 
Oregon 21 57 25 85 35 72 
Pennsylvania 31 66 33 75 54 77 
Rhode Island 40 43 39 55 57 85 
South Carolina 9 44 33 74 45 76 
South Dakota 12 19 45 58 42 79 
Tennessee 30 33 35 91 49 83 
Texas 6 25 28 63 27 61 
Utah 8 35 28 56 32 64 
Vermont 49 50 35 80 61 85 
Virginia 18 29 31 69 34 71 
Washington 32 40 24 75 47 82 
West Virginia 14 45 42 83 47 89 
Wisconsin 14 65 29 67 51 83 
Wyoming 2 35 39 53 40 77 
 
U.S. average 21 44 30 67 41 73 
 
a Below 100 percent of the poverty line.  
b Below 200 percent of the poverty line. 
 
Source: Deparle and Ericson (2009). 
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